Integrated Human-Robotic Missions to the Moon and Mars: Mission Operations Design Implications by Lee, Young et al.
 1
1                                                          
Integrated Human-Robotic Missions to the Moon and 
Mars:  Mission Operations Design Implications 
 
Andrew Mishkin 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, CA 91109 
818-354-0986 
andrew.h.mishkin@jpl.nasa.gov 
 
Young Lee 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, CA 91109 
818-354-1326 
young.p.lee@jpl.nasa.gov 
 
David Korth 
Johnson Space Center 
Houston, TX 77058 
281-244-1115 
david.h.korth@nasa.gov 
 Troy LeBlanc 
Johnson Space Center 
Houston, TX 77058 
281-244-0279 
troy.p.leblanc@nasa.gov 
 
 
 
Abstract—For most of the history of space exploration, 
human and robotic programs have been independent, and 
have responded to distinct requirements. The NASA Vision 
for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the 
Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the 
complexity of this range of missions will require an 
unprecedented use of automation and robotics in support of 
human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, 
including roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 
minutes, interplanetary transit times of many months, and 
the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the 
evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less 
dependent on real-time monitoring and response by an 
Earthbound operations team. Robotic systems and 
automation will augment human capability, increase human 
safety by providing means to perform many tasks without 
requiring immediate human presence, and enable the 
transfer of traditional mission control tasks from the ground 
to crews. Developing and validating the new paradigm and 
its associated infrastructure may place requirements on 
operations design for nearer-term lunar missions. The 
authors, representing both the human and robotic mission 
operations communities, assess human lunar and Mars 
mission challenges, and consider how human-robot 
operations may be integrated to enable efficient joint 
operations, with the eventual emergence of a unified 
exploration operations culture. 1 2
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For the first half-century of the U.S. space program, human 
and robotic missions have been conducted almost entirely 
independently. Separate mission operations processes—and 
cultures—have evolved at Johnson Space Center and Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, each geared to the unique 
challenges of the two classes of missions. Recently, under 
the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA has begun 
working toward returning humans to the Moon, with the 
eventual intention of moving on to Mars. This new program 
raises the possibility of integrating robotic elements into 
human missions, with robotic systems potentially operating 
in tandem with human presence to perform mundane tasks, 
minimize risk to human crews, and maximize human 
availability for critical tasks and exploration.  
Robotic spacecraft on deep space missions must commonly 
function independently for hours, days, or even weeks 
without communications with ground operators, due to a 
variety of resource limitations. The interplanetary distances 
over which these spacecraft are controlled result in 
communications time delays of minutes to hours. 
Responding to these constraints, human operators of robotic 
missions have developed processes to produce carefully 
validated sequences of commands, which are uplinked and 
stored on the spacecraft during a communications 
opportunity, and subsequently govern spacecraft actions for 
an extended period of time. In addition, automated fault-
recovery capabilities are built into the spacecraft system to 
ensure that, given an anomaly, the spacecraft will put itself 
into a state maximizing both survivability and probability of 
re-establishing contact with ground-based operators. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060056403 2019-08-30T00:08:47+00:00Z
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Current human missions to low Earth orbit (LEO) are 
characterized by near-continuous communications, minimal 
time delay, and high bandwidth. Operators in mission 
control can observe the results of individual command 
executions prior to issuing the next command. Flight 
controllers and astronauts work together as an integrated 
team. Typically, space shuttle mission activities and critical 
operations activities onboard the space station are planned 
in detail months before the event, whereas steady-state 
quiescent operations planned for the space station are 
usually more relaxed and planned only weeks and days in 
advance. When anomalies occur, the crew and flight 
controllers are directed to caution and warning procedures 
for recovery and activities are re-planned to return to 
nominal operations.  
Human Mars expeditions will present several challenges to 
the current approaches to mission operations. At Earth-Mars 
distances, communications time delays will prohibit normal 
voice conversations between astronauts and mission control; 
ground monitoring of systems will be unable to provide 
immediate response to onboard state changes; commands 
sent from the ground may no longer be appropriate by the 
time they are received onboard; onboard contingency 
response must be robust to possible long-term 
communications disruption. Robotic systems operating in 
the vicinity of human crews will raise safety concerns; 
control authority for robots may shift from local astronaut to 
remote astronaut to mission control and back. 
2. HUMAN MISSION OPERATIONS OVERVIEW 
Human space operations endeavors are currently focused in 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and come in two flavors, long 
duration (ISS) and short duration (Space Shuttle missions, 
Soyuz missions, Shenzou missions). The general following 
overview addresses NASA human operations. 
In common between both ISS and STS operations are the 
fundamental products and tools used and the rigorous crew 
and flight controller training programs. Among the key 
products are the crew and ground operations procedures, 
flight rules, and mission plans. Procedures spell out how to 
perform tasks ranging from commanding to physical 
maintenance and equipment assembly, and are verified and 
validated rigorously before use. Flight rules are developed 
pre-mission and document pre-determined mission 
controller decisions and responses to limit violations, off-
nominal events, etc. Mission timelines are schedules 
specifying both crew and ground events (or activities) 
against time. Timelines are re-planned daily and 
supplementary information is provided to crews daily 
during the mission to supplement operations. Commands 
and command sequences are developed pre-mission and 
rigorously verified and validated before becoming available 
for use by mission controllers. 
Shuttle operations can be characterized as highly optimized 
operations environments where crew and ground teams 
work in concert to achieve mission objectives while 
ensuring crew safety and maintaining vehicle integrity. 
Missions are short in duration, relative to the length of ISS 
expeditions, and timelines are highly choreographed. 
Detailed mission planning begins about one year in advance 
of the mission. Crews begin flight-specific training months 
in advance. Three to four months prior to missions a formal 
programmatic Flight Operations Review (FOR) is 
conducted of all mission products (e.g. timelines, 
procedures, flight rules, etc.). Following the FOR, ground 
controllers and flight crews begin performing flight-specific 
simulations in order to further refine mission procedures, 
flight rules, and timelines; off nominal scenarios are 
addressed as well. From a communications standpoint, 
shuttle missions are characterized by nearly continuous 
communications coverage, negligible communications 
delays, and high-bandwidth services for video and data 
exchange between crews and mission controllers. During 
mission operations, the flight control team monitors crew 
operations and vehicle performance, and provides necessary 
information to ensure crew safety, vehicle integrity, and 
mission success. Crews enter and execute commands to the 
vehicle through general purpose computers (GPCs). 
Command loads are rigorously developed, verified, and 
validated pre-mission. Plans and procedures are provided to 
crews in paper format. The optimized operating 
environment of STS operations provides a good starting 
point for developing systems and processes needed for 
future CEV operations. 
There are several key differences between ISS and STS 
operations. Attributes of ISS operations include: a less 
optimized operations and planning environment, need for 
logistics and re-supply management strategies, multi-
national participation at a partner level, reliance on ground 
controllers for daily vehicle systems management and long-
term vehicle maintenance plans. ISS operations can be 
characterized as a continuously operating environment in 
LEO with nearly continuous communications coverage, 
high bandwidth uplink and downlink capability, and a less 
optimized daily operating focus, as compared to STS 
operations. To date, there has been a continuous human 
presence on the ISS for over 5.5 years. Further, ISS is a 
multi-national distributed operation with control centers 
located in four partner nations. Each partner is responsible 
for the management if its own element with the overall 
integrated operational responsibility residing with NASA at 
JSC. Each partner provides planning inputs to NASA for 
integration into a single plan for crew and ground 
execution. The long duration nature of ISS operations 
requires a less-optimized operations and planning approach 
as compared with STS operations. Additionally, the long 
duration continuously operating nature of ISS introduces the 
elements of on-orbit logistics, re-supply, and maintenance 
management not present in STS on-orbit operations. Both 
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crew and mission controllers have the capability to 
command the vehicle. 
ISS crews rely on mission controllers for day-to-day vehicle 
systems management, anomaly resolution and trend 
analysis, and to aide in contingency response. Conversely, 
crews are primarily responsible for physical systems 
maintenance and upkeep, vehicle assembly, and science 
operations. Finally, one additional key aspect of the long 
duration nature of ISS not encountered on STS missions is 
the crew psychological aspect. The long durations stays 
onboard ISS require a robust ground support system 
designed to provide both leisure and medical support for 
ISS crews. The crew interface with the vehicle for 
commanding and systems status is through laptop 
computers. Plans, procedures, and supplementary 
information are provided to crews and mission controllers 
electronically over a web-based network. The use of the 
web has proved a very effective means for disseminating 
operations information throughout the distributed 
environment of ISS. Since the beginning of ISS operations 
over 7 years ago, ISS systems and operations processes 
have undergone evolution. This evolution has occurred 
during manned operations, unlike any other NASA manned 
program to date.  
The processes and mechanisms developed to handle the 
long duration continuously operating nature of ISS will be 
directly applicable to further long duration manned 
programs such as lunar base operations and future 
expeditions to Mars. 
 3. ROBOTIC MISSION OPERATIONS OVERVIEW 
Due to the time-delays inherent in communicating with 
distant spacecraft, robotic deep space missions have adopted 
the approach of stored sequence execution. For some 
missions, a single command load may comprise tens of 
thousands of commands, governing the spacecraft’s actions 
for weeks or even months. Since these spacecraft must 
perform without the benefit of immediate human feedback 
or intervention, the command sequences must be thoroughly 
validated to ensure that their execution will be consistent 
with the original intent of the human operators, and that no 
risk to the spacecraft will be incurred. A command sequence 
that leaves the spacecraft in an unintended orientation, or 
inadvertently shuts off a key device could cause a premature 
end to the mission, with loss of the spacecraft.  
In order to mitigate this problem, two approaches are 
traditionally employed: rigorous sequence validation, often 
involveing high-fidelity testbed execution of sequences, 
and, onboard, fault recovery responses built into the 
spacecraft software. If the spacecraft has not received any 
commands within a specified time, the spacecraft may 
autonomously change its attitude to point its antenna at the 
Earth, to improve the chances of receiving new instructions. 
If the spacecraft is solar-powered, it will point its arrays 
toward the sun to ensure that it remains power positive, and 
therefore will not die while waiting for new instructions. 
(Onboard fault responses also mitigate the effects of 
environment-induced problems, such as cosmic-ray hits to 
electronic components.) 
The huge consequences of losing a mission has led to the 
evolution of an extremely conservative approach to 
command sequence development and validation. Traditional 
commands are time-tagged to specify exactly when they are 
to be triggered. The development of a command load may 
require weeks or more to progress through design of an 
activity plan and then to building actual command 
sequences. For orbiters and free-flyers, the space 
environment is unlikely to impact the spacecraft in 
unexpected ways, so building commands far in advance of 
use presents no problems. 
For the less common planetary surface missions, such as 
Mars Pathfinder and Mars Exploration Rover (MER), the 
mission operations planning cycle is generally much more 
compressed. Since the results of interactions with the terrain 
are much less predictable, operations must be conducted 
using a far more reactive approach than for orbiter missions. 
Both of these surface rover missions were able respond to 
telemetry and generate new command loads daily.  
One recent innovation of the Mars Pathfinder rover 
“Sojourner” and the MER mission has been the use of 
“event-driven” sequencing. The time required for a rover to 
complete a traverse through a hazard-filled terrain while 
autonomously avoiding those hazards cannot be fully 
predicted. If the drive takes longer than expected, the next 
command in a time-tagged sequence may begin before the 
rover is ready. So, instead of clocking out commands, MER 
sequences are designed so that the next command starts 
when the prior command reports completion. This approach 
avoids command conflicts, at the expense of increasing the 
uncertainty as to when commands will execute. 
While the approaches employed to date for robotic deep 
space missions have been highly effective, and have 
enabled exploration throughout the solar system, they too 
will need to evolve to make robotic systems effective and 
productive on a time scale useful to astronauts when they 
arrive on Mars.  
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4. THE LONG VIEW: CHALLENGES OF HUMAN 
MISSIONS TO MARS 
Time Delay 
Communications time-delays of minutes have yet to be 
encountered on human space missions. Round trip 
communications delays of 6 to 40 minutes will transform 
conversations between the Mission Control Center (MCC) 
and astronauts to a series of emails and/or voicemails. What 
would be a two minute conversation between ground 
operators and crew in LEO, with four questions and 
responses, would easily require over 2.5 hours when the 
crew is on Mars.  
Continuous communications time-delays are not necessarily 
analogous to frequent loss-of- signal (LOS) that may occur 
during Earth-orbiting missions. For ISS, an upcoming LOS 
may force certain activities to be carefully planned to fall 
within a given time period, but the cycle of command-
execute-monitor-command remains very short, allowing 
many cycles while the communications link is available. A 
more relevant analogy for time-delays would be a situation 
in which a single command is sent just before LOS, and the 
result of command execution cannot be discerned until 
acquisition of signal (AOS), after which only a single 
command can be sent before the next LOS. 
A premium will be placed on unambiguous and complete 
message content, given the time impact and frustration 
inherent in requesting clarification. This may lead to the 
development of a “standard interplanetary English” to 
ensure reliable communication of meaning when 
acknowledgment of transmission and correction of errors is 
costly. 
Time-delays of significantly greater than 40 minutes may 
exist at Mars, unless infrastructure is emplaced to mitigate 
the problem. Any likely landing site on the surface of Mars 
will be in line-of-sight to Earth only about half of each 
Martian day, due to the planet’s rotation. A communications 
satellite network in orbit over Mars could reduce the 
duration of LOS, but without such a network, crews would 
be out of contact for many hours at a time. 
No “Escape to Earth” 
Human LEO missions currently maintain an “Escape to 
Earth” option: In many anomaly cases, such as loss of 
redundancy in a critical system, the crew can de-orbit and 
return to Earth within hours. But with Earth-Mars transit 
times of several months, no such “Escape to Earth” safety 
net will be available.  
Evolution from Mission Control to Mission Support 
The two factors just described will drive the evolution of 
MCC teams from the traditional control role to an advisory 
function. First, the communications time delays inherent at 
Earth-Mars distances will preclude ground-based operators 
from commanding and monitoring time-critical functions, or 
addressing anomalies requiring rapid response. Second, 
with no rapid return to Earth possible, the crew will be 
required to handle contingencies (including potential loss of 
communications with the ground) over extended time 
periods.  
Even in the current environment, it is unacceptable to put a 
crew at risk in the event of a communications failure 
between mission control and the spacecraft. While it has 
never been necessary, the Shuttle is capable of (and 
required to by policy)—independent of the MCC—de-
orbiting within 24 hours if a sustained communications 
outage occurs.  
If we accept the contention that crews at Mars may need to 
respond to significant anomalies on their own, then we must 
ensure that they have the tools at hand to do so. Under these 
conditions, astronauts will necessarily take ownership of 
many traditional MCC functions. (In the parlance of the 
Vision for Space Exploration, “autonomy” is defined as this 
independence from ground controllers.) Given present-day 
implementations of operations, and the complexity of the 
spacecraft that will take humans to Mars and sustain them 
there, manual control of these assets would quickly 
overwhelm or exhaust an un-augmented crew, even without 
considering the workload impact of handling an anomaly. 
This implies a requirement for significant onboard 
automation capable of real-time monitoring and performing 
routine and repetitive activities without continuous 
supervision. Such onboard automation will free the crew for 
critical functions: responding to time-critical anomalies, 
implementing repairs, and exploring. 
As onboard automation is implemented to control standard 
functions under extended duration off-nominal conditions, 
the use of this automation during normal operations must be 
considered. Onboard automation has one major advantage 
over an Earthbound operations team: at maximum Earth-
Mars range, automation can detect and potentially respond 
to a state change twenty minutes before the ground is even 
aware of a problem and forty minutes before the earliest 
command from the ground could arrive at the spacecraft. As 
automation becomes trusted, the MCC team will gain the 
capability to support multiple missions flying 
simultaneously without significant increases in overall team 
size, as a shrinking fraction of the personnel on the team 
must be dedicated to system monitoring and response. A 
larger fraction of the team will instead be focused on 
strategic planning in support of crew exploration and 
survival.  
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When astronauts are operating in an exploration mode, 
activity plans will depend on prior results. One possible 
model is for Earth-based operators to regularly receive 
(delayed) telemetry, running commentary, questions, and 
issues from the crew, ingest these inputs, and then generate 
plans for the next day while the crew on Mars sleeps. For 
plan changes during a surface EVA, a Mars crew will not be 
able to wait for a response from Earth, since the roundtrip 
communications delays would leave them idle—consuming 
resources—for a significant fraction of the Martian day. 
Instead, crews will need the capability to re-plan on the fly, 
without putting themselves at risk. For example, an 
automated scheduling assistant could answer the question: 
“Do we have enough oxygen and energy to deviate from the 
current EVA plan, and go up that hill and take samples of 
that shiny boulder, and still get back to base with sufficient 
margin?”  
Two models have evolved for how Earth-based operators 
support the exploring astronauts. One is a reactive model 
where most decision making is occurring via local 
interaction with the crew, the results of their tasks and the 
conditions around them. The crew will be modifying their 
own plans, procedures and operational notes as they 
explore. The second is the more traditional proactive model 
where the many Earth-based operators consider all manner 
of data coming to them, analyze the information, and then 
produce new plans, procedures and operational notes for the 
crew to utilize in their next operation. Much has been 
learned about how to retrieve and downlink plan, procedure 
and crew notes from the ISS which should at least be used 
as lessons learned for designing this type of downlink 
capability for the exploration missions. However, even with 
an automated scheduling assistant for the crew, the Earth-
based operators will likely still use the same tools and 
capabilities to “flight follow” the crew plan and pre-plan 
several optional plans for subsequent daily schedules.  
Types of Robotic and Automation Support to Human 
Missions  
One of the most valuable resources in the solar system will 
likely be a workhour of an astronaut’s time on Mars. This 
will encourage the application of technology to offload 
crews of as many mundane and support activities as 
possible. There are several distinct classes of robotics and 
automation that may offload different crew activities: 
• Automation for habitat and other system operation, 
maintenance, and diagnostics 
• Software tools for planning, scheduling, and other 
applications 
• Robotic systems that interact with structured 
environments and assembled elements 
• Robotic systems that interact with natural terrain for 
earth-moving, site preparation, and infrastructure 
emplacement 
• Robotic systems for sample return/exploration/helping 
humans determine where to go next 
• Robotic systems to aid humans with exploration 
tasks—handling supplies, samples, tools as humans 
explore in tandem 
Efficiency of Robotic Mission Operations 
As described earlier, current mission operations for deep 
space tend to function at a deliberate pace to ensure the 
correctness of command loads. Even MER, the Mars 
mission with the shortest command-turnaround cycle to 
date, and perhaps the robotic mission most analogous to 
eventual human missions, can manage only one command 
cycle per Martian day. Many people have anecdotally 
estimated the relative effectiveness of the MER rovers 
compared to a hypothetical spacesuited human geologist on 
Mars, often presuming that the human would be 50 to 100 
times faster than the robot at completing mission objectives.  
In the absence of human presence, this level of performance 
has been acceptable; but in support of astronauts, the 
current approach to commanding robotic systems would 
likely be too cumbersome to even be attempted. However, 
there are several options for operation of robotic systems: 
• Direct teleoperation: “Joysticking” of a robot may be 
extremely useful, if an astronaut is available. The 
primary benefit is derived 
• Traditional sequenced control – which is cumbersome 
(local or from Earth) 
• Goal-based control 
 
Exploration-Driven Operations 
To date, the human space program has conducted only 
limited duration exploration missions, the Apollo Moon 
landings of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  
Transfer of Control Authority 
As NASA enters a new era of exploration of the Moon and 
Mars, it is evident that humans and robotics will continue to 
work together in space, both in ways that are well 
understood—astronauts manipulating robotic arms such as 
on the Space Shuttle and ISS—as well as in new ways that 
have not yet been envisioned. New practices to conduct 
mission operations have to be identified and developed in 
order to control many elements in space and on the ground 
simultaneously, elements which need to operate, interact 
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and depend on each other—one of key factors for growing 
mission operations complexity.  
  For example, during the first Lunar Sortie mission (See 
Fig. 1), Lunar Sortie Crew Design Reference Mission), one 
of the operations scenarios involves several ground stations, 
at least two operations centers such as at KSC and JSC, a 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), a Crew Launch Vehicle 
(CLV), a Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) with an Earth 
Departure Stage (EDS), a Lunar Surface and Access 
Module (LSAM), lunar surface extra-vehicular activity 
(EVA) systems, exploration rover(s), and one or more 
telecommunications relay orbiters around the Moon. Thus, 
humans and robotic elements will be simultaneously on the 
ground, in low Earth orbit (LEO), in transit to/from the 
Moon, in orbit around the Moon, and eventually on the 
surface of Moon. During the Lunar Outpost and Mars 
missions, the number of mission operations elements along 
with the locations of human and robotic elements will 
significantly grow. These mission operations scenarios 
illustrate new and increasing mission operations challenges 
of a multi-mission and multi-element nature that NASA 
must learn to cope with by: (1) designing mission 
operations that can handle an unprecedentedly complex 
network of operating elements with humans and robots in 
several locations around the solar system, and (2) 
integrating the multi-mission robotic and human space flight 
operations effectively and efficiently. 
 Simultaneously executing missions with multiple elements 
requires careful development of the Control Hierarchy 
among those multiple involved operating elements to 
minimize conflicts that can arise from the transfer of control 
authority and to provide over-ride among multiple sources. 
It becomes essential to develop a well planned and 
executable control structure that will facilitate: (1) 
mitigating and managing operations-related risks and safety, 
(2) developing effective and efficient operational 
requirements on the system design, (3) guiding system 
implementation to address overall operations costs, and (4) 
performing system verification and validation.  
Some approaches can be taken to develop the hierarchy to 
facilitate effective transfer of control authority among 
multiple elements and to clearly delineate the boundaries of 
control: 
• Examine Constellation Program operations scenarios. 
Identify how the elements of the space-mission 
architecture work together to complete the mission 
(element-oriented operations scenario), how the user 
interacts with the system’s elements and received data 
(user-oriented operations scenario), how the crew 
interacts with the flight and ground crew (crew-oriented 
operations scenario) and how systems and subsystems 
within an element work together (system-oriented 
operations scenario). 
• Overlay mission operations timelines (phases) for each 
scenario for each set of steps and determine which steps 
are carried out in parallel and in serial to identify 
candidate areas to be examined further. 
• Determine which element will play what role for each 
scenario, especially during those periods where 
multiple elements are engaged in parallel operations 
• Integrate the above information to identify the areas 
that need further clarification in terms of roles and 
responsibilities of each element 
 
  A few key factors that can have a great impact on the 
development of the Control Hierarchy need to be 
recognized and examined: 
• The degree of automation and autonomy  
• The characteristics of each mission, mission phase, and 
each control authority option 
• Human factors in the decision making process 
• Mission modes during both nominal and off-nominal 
conditions 
The transfer of control authority among multiple elements 
has a great implication on mission operations design and 
lifecycle costs. Perhaps, the following questions can be 
answered through careful analysis and evaluation of control 
information flows during mission phases: 
• What it is to have control authority 
• What it is to transfer control authority 
• Circumstances under which control authority is 
transferred 
• How control authority transfer is mechanized or 
implemented 
• Hierarchy of needs relative to control authority transfer, 
and  
• Rules under which control authority transfer takes place 
5. THE CLOSER VIEW: CHALLENGES OF HUMAN 
LUNAR MISSIONS 
Humans have been to the Moon before. However, some of 
the attributes of the missions that will return people to the 
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lunar surface, in particular for extended habitation of a 
permanent lunar outpost, will be unprecedented: 
• Far more conservative risk posture than during the 
Apollo era 
• Buildup and maintenance of permanent infrastructure 
• Multiple missions to the same site 
• Eventual sustained human presence during lunar night 
• Long-duration stays on the lunar surface 
• Monitoring and maintenance of infrastructure during 
gaps in human presence 
• Use of lunar missions as analogues for later Mars 
missions 
Many of the items in this list provide opportunities to make 
use of the Moon as a testing ground for later Mars missions. 
However, the Moon does not inherently mimic the level of 
isolation that will exist for astronauts on Mars, and lunar 
missions will not address the impact of significant 
communications time-delay that likely represents the single 
greatest challenge to current human operations models.  
Only a mandated effort to impose Mars-like constraints on 
at least some lunar missions will lead to the development 
and validation of technologies and operations approaches 
during the upcoming lunar exploration phase.  Without such 
a mandate, our preparedness for the challenges of human 
Mars missions will remain severely lacking. 
6. A MISSION OPERATIONS PARADIGM 
What strategy will support effective mission operations 
given the challenges that will be present when astronauts 
are exploring the surface of Mars? Most of the challenges 
identified derive from communications time-delays that 
simply do not permit the immediate knowledge of and 
capacity to influence spacecraft state that we are currently 
comfortable with and reliant upon in human spaceflight. 
(The same desire to be fully in control of exactly what will 
occur and when it will occur on the spacecraft holds in the 
robotic mission arena as well. The acceptance of 
autonomous rover navigation and event-driven command 
sequences represents just the beginnings of change in this 
culture.) 
  Operations in the Mars mission scenario will require a 
different division of responsibility between ground teams 
and crews. In the general context, mission operations should 
be viewed as comprising both the crew and the ground 
control team. In the Mars mission scenario, responsibility 
for strategic and tactical operations will reside primarily 
with the ground team with the execution operations residing 
primarily with the crew with involvement from the ground. 
Crews will require new tools to allow resource scheduling 
and conflict resolution to implement strategies and goals set 
by the ground teams. Further, crews will require more 
sophisticated situational awareness or “battlefield 
management” tools to keep track of resources (robots, other 
crew, etc.) in the field. During execution, ground teams will 
focus on systems performance trending, data archiving, long 
range planning, and data dissemination. 
We suggest here a multi-layered distributed approach 
responsive to the multiple regimes of time-delay that will 
exist for a Mars mission. Mission planning and execution 
functions must be shared across ground operators and crew, 
and between the Earth and Mars, to enable effective conduct 
of the mission. Consider four timescales: 
• Long-term:  weeks or months 
• Strategic:  a day or more 
• Local:  minutes to hours 
• Immediate: seconds to minutes 
Long-term planning, looking ahead weeks or months, will 
be performed by operations team members on Earth. While 
the long-term planning cycle will respond to new 
information received from the distant crew and spacecraft 
systems, barring a major anomaly, this planning should not 
be significantly impacted by short-term changes to crew 
activities. Within the purview of long-term plans will be 
schedules for crew exploration excursions, ensuring overall 
management of consumables, etc. 
Strategic planning may be shared between the ground and 
the crew. At this level, the Mission Control Center will 
provide plans for what the crew will do “tomorrow.” Given 
messages, images, instrument data, and requests received 
from the crew on a given day, this function will provide 
overnight a daily plan of activities, consistent with the long-
term plan and current resources. At times, this function may 
be delegated to the crew, as they should have the necessary 
information and tools in hand, consistent with the need to 
make strategic plans in the event of an anomaly. At this 
same level, ground operators will define activity plans for 
on-site robotic systems that are not being operated directly 
by the crew.  
The local planning level must be executed at Mars, since the 
Earth-Mars time-delays would not permit timely responses 
on the timescale of minutes. (An astronaut would not wait 
for Earth-based operators to render a decision regarding the 
conduct of an EVA, since waiting for a response could 
make the question moot.) At this level, daily strategic 
activity plans for the crew or robotic systems may be 
modified in response to new observations or other 
information. Astronauts at different sites on Mars (e.g., an 
astronaut in the habitat and others on EVA or driving on a 
rover kilometers away) will coordinate their activities at this 
level. One or more crew in a habitat may serve in the MCC 
role for other crew members performing an EVA. 
Astronauts will specify new goals or high-level commands 
to robots that are operating in the vicinity. Relevant time 
delays will be seconds to a minute or so, if relay 
communications between sites is necessary.  
At the immediate level, planning and execution are 
inextricably linked: astronauts are carrying out tasks, and 
making real-time decisions regarding their next steps. At 
this level, one astronaut may be working alone or in direct 
line-of-sight with additional astronauts. An astronaut would 
directly teleoperate a robot and control its progress. There 
are essentially no time delays at this level.  
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Each of these levels works to a timeline at a different 
resolution. Interactions between timelines must be 
coordinated to ensure smooth execution of the mission. 
7. CONCLUSION 
As humans return to the Moon and then prepare to make the 
first journeys to Mars, the perception of human and robotic 
missions as independent programs will wane. Current 
approaches to the conduct of mission operations—whether 
for human or robotic missions—are insufficient to the needs 
of human Mars missions. Automation and robotics will 
become integral elements of human missions, ever more 
essential tools for both ensuring human survival and 
maximizing crew effectiveness during each exploration 
mission. As crews must function more and more distant 
from the Earth—in time as well as space—direction of 
semi-autonomous robotic systems will become a key role of 
Earth-based mission controllers, extending their reach to 
support astronauts while freeing crews for exploration, 
discovery, repair, and anomaly response. 
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